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222 RETAIL CLERKS' UNION v. SUl'ERIOR C-OURT l52 C.~d 
[Sac. No. 6938. In Bank. May 19, 1959.] 
RETAIL CLERKS' UNION, LOCAL NO. 1364, AFL-CIO 
(an Unincorporated Association) et aI., Petitioners, Y. 
SUPERIOR COURT OF 'fRINITY COUNTY, Respond-
ent; CORNELIUS A. HOOD et al., Real Parties ill 
Interest. 
[1] Prohibition-Petition.-A petition by labor nnions and organ-
izers for writ of prohibition to restrain the superior court from 
further proceedings in an action brought against them by 
employers who operated lL retail market to enjoin them froll1 
interfering with the employers' business did 110t by alleging 
as bare conclusions of law that the court had no jurisdiction 
of the subject matter of the action but that exclusive juris-
diction was with federal judicial and administrative agencies, 
notwithstanding a similar avennent in the plaintiffs' answer to 
petitioners' cross-complaint therein, establish any facts as to 
the effect of any alleged labor practice on interstate com-
merce within the meaning of the federal Labor Management 
Relations Act of 1947, as amended (the Taft-Hartley Act, 
29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq.), but rather thel·e was an unresolved 
"factual question" (in addition to questions of law) on which 
determination of the superior court's jurisdiction might even-
tually depend, but no such issue was ripe for resolution in the 
prohibition proceeding. 
[2] Labor-Labor Legislation-"Right-to-Work" Ordinance-Va-
lidity.-Whel·e a county "right-to-work" ordinance relied on 
in an injunction suit by employers of a _ retail market to 
restrain labor unions and organizers from interfering with 
plaintiffs' business by picketing to compel plaintiffs to execute 
collective bargaining agreements with the demanding unions 
contravened the statewide statutory policy as to the freedom 
of employes to organize, select representatives and through 
them bargain collectively for the traditional objectives of 
organized labor, subject only to such regulations and proscrip-
tions as are set forth in the statutes or otherwise imposed by 
law (Lab. Code, §§ 920-923, 1115-1122, 1126), where the ordi-
nance partially duplicated statewide statutory pOlicy insofar 
as it prohibited jurisdiction-organizational nSiI:lUlts on estah-
lished employe-employer relationships, and where its conflict 
with general law could not be eliminated by mechanical sepa-
ration of its language, the injunction suit could 110t continue 
insofar as it sought relief nnder the ordinance. 
-------- -. ----_.- --- ----_._------------- .-- - -- -
[2J See Ca1.Jur.2d, Lahor, * 10 ct seq.; Am.Jur., L~lhor, § 3 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [lJ Prohibition, § 54; [2J I,nbor, § 1.1i 
[3] Labor, § 24; [4] Labor, § 25. 
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[3] Id,-Remedies'-PIohibition." In ;. proce('ding jn l'l"-litil)lti"l1 
by lahor unions and oJ'(;lInizl'rs 10 C'OIllPf'\ thl' slIpcri')r ('Illll'l 
to desist f!"Om further proecedings in an action brought against 
them by employers of a retail market to enjoin them from 
interfering with the employers' business, where neither em-
ployers nor employes wanted a union shop agreement with or 
melllbership in the denl!uulinci unions, where the unions sought 
by the pressures of picketing' to induce the employers to compel 
their employes to join such unwanted unions "and constitute 
them their bargaining agents, where the unions by merely 
alleging in the injullction suit thnt the superior court did not 
have jUI'isdiction hut that such jurisdiction was in the federal 
judicial and administrative agencies did not establish any facts 
as to thc effect of any allegcd labor practice on interstate com-
merce, and where the unions also cross-colllplained in the 
injunction suit alleging that the employers coerced their em-
ployes to prevent the exercise of their right to full freedom 
of association and designation of 1't'presentatives of their own 
choosing, thc injunction suit could continue both on the com-
plaint and cross-complaint in respect to any relevant relief 
which was not precluded by federal law and which was pro-
vided under state law as declared in Lab, Code, §§ 921-923, 
1115-1122, 1126, and the writ of p~'ohibitinn should be denied. 
[4:] Id.-Remedies-lnjunctive Relief.-A preliminary injunction 
enjoining any picketing, boycott, strike or threats for the pur-
pose of forcing and inducing plaintiff employers to make an 
agreement requiring their employes to become or remuin mem-
bers of any labor organization in order to obtain, l'etain or 
continue in employment with plaintiffs was proper since it 
enjoined conduct which was tortious under Lab. Code, §§ 921-
923, 1115-1122, 1126. A further portion of the preliminary in-
junction characterizing the enjoined conduet as violative of 
an invalid county "right-to-work" ordinance was mere descrip-
tive surplusage, utterly void in any application. 
PROCEEDINGS in prohibition to compel the Superior 
Court of Trinity County to desist from further proceedings in 
an action, Writ denied. 
Charles P. Scully, Victor Van Bourg and Halpin & Halpin 
for Petitioners. 
Stennett M. Sheppard, District Attorney, for Respondent, 
Severson, Davis & Larson, Nathan R. Berke and George 
Brunn for Bral Parties in Interest. 
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SCHAUER, J.-Petitioners (labor unions and organizers) 
seek a writ of prohibition (with mandatory as well as pro-
hibitory effect) to compel respondent superior court of Trinity 
County (1) to desist from further proceedings in an action 
(hereinafter· sometimes referred to as the basic or superior 
court action) brought against petitioners by the real parties in 
interest (employers who operate a retail market), (2) to dis-
solve an "order for preliminary injunction and preliminary 
injunction" entered in such basic action, and (3) to grant peti-
tioners' "motions to dismiss and vacate any judgment, order 
for preliminary injunction and preliminary injunction" 
entered in that action. 
The complaint in the subject basic action alleges that de-
fendants (petitioners here) are interfering with plaintiffs' 
business by picketing to compel plaintiffs to execute collective 
bargaining agreements with the demanding unions; that the 
unions are not authorized to represent, or to negotiate for, any 
of plaintiffs' employes; but that the agreements contain a 
provision that plaintiffs will require their employes to become 
and remain members of the unauthorized unions (and thereby 
choose and designate such unions as their bargaining repre-
sentatives) as a condition of retaining their employment. 
Plaintiffs in the basic action seek injunctive relief and ask 
leave to amend to set forth damages when the amount of such 
damages becomes ascertainable. The complaint alleges the 
enactment of a county "right-to-work" ordinance which by 
its terms became effective on the date of the filing of the 
complaint. The provisions of the ordinance (No. 22S) are in 
all material respects, including the definition of "labor organi-
zation" in section 1, identical with the provisions of the San 
Benito County ordinance quoted and summarized in Chavez v. 
Sargent, ante, p. 162 [339 P.2d SOl], footnote 1. The facts 
in this case, however, are antithetical to those in Chavez. 
There all three interested entities-employer, employes (the 
majority of them), and the subject union-want to execute a 
union shop agreement. Here, neither employers nor employes 
want a contract with or membership in the demanding union~. 
The unions, nevertheless, seek hy the pressures of picketing to 
induce the employers to compel their employes to join such 
unwanted unions and constitute them their bargaining agent,;. 
Petitioners attack the validity of the ordinance on variolls 
grounds; also they urgc that exclusive jurisdiction of this con-
troversy is in the National Labor Relations Board and the 
federal courts. We have concluded that the record does not 
,) 
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establish that exclusive jurisdiction is in the federal board and 
COUrts; that the ordinance is invalid for the reasons explained 
in .Chat'cz Y. Sargent, allie, p. 162 L339 P.2d 801]; but 
that since the subject superior court action seeks relief which 
conceivably can be afforded under the same state law which 
renders the ordinance void, the proceedings therein can con-
tinue on both the complaint and the defendants' cross-com-
plaint. 
The preliminary injunction attacked by petitioners re-
strains them from ' 'picketing, boycott, strike, or threats' , 
for the purpose of inducing plaintiffs-employers to make an 
agreement that they will require their employes to become 
or remain members of any labor organization as a condition 
of employment, in violation of Ordinance Number 228. In 
support of this inj wIction the court found, among other 
things, that "Most of the employees of plaintiffs are not mem-
bers of the defendant labor organizations and the employees 
of plaintiffs have not at any time demanded from plaintiffs 
a union shop or union recognition, nor have such employees 
participated at any time in the negotiations for collective bar· 
gaining tJ{Jreements, nor have the employees of plaintiffs de-
signated the defendants or any of them as the·ir representa-
tifJes for collective bargaining." (Italics added.) All of the 
italicized portion of the quoted finding is material but, as 
explained in' the Chavez case, ante, p. 162 [339 P.2d 801] 
that which is of paramount importance in bringing this case 
within the control of the statutes which declare the overriding 
state policy and which must govern disposition of this litiga-
tion (Lab. Code, §§ 920-923, 1115-1122, 1126, quoted in OhafJez 
v. Sargent, ante, footnotes 6 through 8) is the fact that plain-
tiffs' employes have not chosen or designated petitioners as 
their representatives. 
The answer of petitioners (as defendants in the basic action) 
alleges ., That the court has no jurisdiction of the subject 
matter of this action . . . in this, that the exclusive juris-
diction thereof lies with the judicial and administrative 
agencies of the United States." Petitioners also cross·com-
plained, alleging that plaintiffs coerced their employes "to 
prevent the exercise of their right to full freedom of as80-
ciation, self-organization and designation of representatives 
of their own choosing." Plaintiffs' answer to the cross-com-
plaint aUt'ges "that the Court has no jurisdiction of the 
subjt'ct matter of the cross-complaint ... in that the exclu-
JlC.2d~ 
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sivejurisuietioll thereof lies with the NatiOllal Labor Relations 
Board." 
Petitioners urge that by thc above quoted allegation of the 
answer they have alleged, and by the above quoted averment 
of the answcr to the cross-complaint plaiutiffs have admitted, 
that the plaintiffs' business affects interstate commerce with-
in the meaning of the federal Labor Management Relations 
Act of 1947, as amended (the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C.A. 
§ 141 et seq.) ; that under the natioJlul act the state court ha~ 
no jurisdictioll to grant relief ou account of the conduct here 
in question; and that therefore (as ill Calise v. Super'ior Court 
(1958), 159 Cal.App.2d 126, 133, 135 [3] [323 P.2d 859]) 
prohibition should issue. [1] We are not prepared to hold 
that the allegations of bare conclusions of law as to jurisdic-
tion establish any facts as to the effect of any alleged labor 
practice npon interstate commerce (see Braum v. Aguilar 
(1927), 202 Cal. 143, 149 [259 P. 735); Kidwell v. Ketler 
(1905), 146 Cal. 12, 17, 18 [79 P. 514] [pleader is not bound 
byallegatioll or admission of conclusion of law) ; Faulkner v. 
California Toll Bridge Authority (1953), 40 Cal.2d 317, 
329 [9),330 (12) [253 P.2d 659] [conclusions of law are not 
admitted by demurrer); Wheeler v. Oppenlleimer (1956), 
140 Cal.App.2d 497, 501 [3) [295 P.2d 128) [conclusion of 
law "tendered no issue") ; rather, we agree with the superior 
court that in 'the present state of the record there is an un-
resolved "factual question" (in addition to questions of law) 
upon which determination of its jurisdiction may eventually 
depend. At the present time the allegations as to jurisdiction 
show at most that upon further proceedings in the basic action 
questions of federal preemption may be presented; but they 
-show also that no such issue is ripe for resolution in this pro-
ceeding. 
[2] Here, as in the Chavez case, ante, p. 162 [339 P.2d 
801] the ordinance contravenes the state-wide statutory 
policy as to the freedom of employes to organize, select repre-
sentatives, and through them bargain collectively for the 
traditional objectives of organized labor, suhje('t only to such 
r£'glllations and proscription!> as arc set forth in the statute~ 
or otherwise imposed by law (Lab. Cod!', §§ 920 .. 923, 11]5-
1122, 1126; see by way of examples of "rf'guJations and pro-
scriptions ... otherwise impo~ed," the decisional law of 
James v. Mar'itlship Corp. (1944), 25 Ca1.2d 721 [155 P.2d 
329, 1GO A.L.R 900); H'ughes v. Sup!J1'wr Conrt (1948), 32 
Cn1.211 BriO [198 P.2t1 88:>], nffi I' III p(l Jlughs v. Rllprl'iur 
) 
.) 
) 
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Court (1950), 339 U,S. 460 [70 S.Ct. 718, 94 L.Ed, 985]); 
likewise, the ordinance partially duplil.'ates state-wide statu-
tory policy insofar as it prohibits jurisdiction-organizational 
assaults on established employe-employer relatiol13hips; and 
its conflict with general law cannot be eliminated by mechan-
ical separation of its language. The basic superior court ac-
tion, thcrefore, cannot continue insoiar as it seeks relief under 
the ordinance. 
[3] The subject action, however, can continue both 011 the 
complaint and on the cross-complaint in· respect to any rele-
vant relief which is not, on the facts, precluded by federal 
law and which is provided under state law as declared in sec-
tions 921 through 923, sections 1115 through 1122, and sec-
tion 1126 of the Labor Code. (Chavez y. Sargent, ante, 
ll. 162 [339 r.2d 801].) If it develops that plaintiffs' 
ImsineBs does 110t affcct interstate commerce within the mean-
ing of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, and 
that defendants are picketing to compel plaintiffs (the em-
ployers) to violate state law by coercing their employes to 
designate the defendants as their exclusive bargaining repre-
sentatives, and to accept terms and conditions of employment 
dictated by defendants, without authorization by plaintiffs' 
employes, then plaintiffs may be entitled to both injunctive 
relief and damages. If it deyelops that the subject dispute 
interferes ,,"'ith the flow of interstate commerce (see the Taft-
Hartley declaration of policy and purpose, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141), 
then the alleged conduct of defendants, tortious but peaceful 
within the federal concept, cannot be restrained or redressed 
by the state. This conclusion follows because no facts are 
alleged or found which tend to exclude plaintiffs from tIl\' 
class segregated by the federal authorityl for nonaccess to 
the courts. (San Diego Building Tmdes Council v. GaI'mon 
(1959), 339 CS. 236 [79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775]; San 
D·iego Bldg. Tmdcs Cou.ncil v. Ga;'moll (1957), 353 U.S. 26 
l77 S.Ct. 607, 609, 1 L.Ed.2d 618].) 
[4] The preliminary injunction enjoins "any picketing, 
boycott, strike, or threat for the purpose of forcing and in-
ducing plaintiffs to make I1n agreement requiring plaintiffs' 
employees to become or remain members of ... any . . . 
labor orgalli7.ution, ill order to obtain, retain or continue in 
-----, .. '.,. _. _ .._._._----- -------_._---_ .. _" ._-_.--.---
'Th" Natioual I.abor Relations Board, according to Ib present sell'· 
iwpoKed limitation of jurisdiction, will not net in caKes of alleged unfuh· 
lahor practit~ell where the employer is a retailer with a gross annual husi· 
ness of less than :1';;00,000. 
) 
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employment with plaintiffs which in any way is in violatum 
0/ Ordinance No. 228 0/ the County 0/ Trinity, which bccam,~ 
c/lecti·vc on September 18, 1957." (Italics added.) The UIl-
italicized portion of the preliminary injunction is proper, for 
it enjoins conduct which under the circumstances found is 
tortious under the above referred to sections of the Labor 
Code and which has not been shown to affect interstate COlU-
merce so as to bring it within the purview of the national 
act. The emphasized portion of the preliminary injunction, 
characterizing the enjoined conduct as violative of the invalid 
ordinance, is mere descriptive surplusage, utterly void in any 
application. 
For the reasons above stated, the alternative writ is dis-
charged and the peremptory writ is denied. 
Shenk, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
McCOMB, J.-I concur in the judgment and opinion, for 
the reasons expressed in my concurring opinion in Chavez v. 
Sa1'gent, ante, p. 162 [339 P.2d 801]. 
TRAYNOR, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in 
the judgment insofar as it determines that the Trinity County 
ordinance is invalid. It is my opinion, however, that the 1ind-
ing relied upon by the majority opinion does not establish 
that petitioners' objective was unlawful under state law and 
that the preliminary injunction is therefore without support 
in the record. 
Petitioners, certain unions and their officers seeking to 
organize plaintiffs' Super Market employees, commenced 
picketing the market to induce plaintiffs to execute union shop 
agreements. Plaintiffs' employees had not selected the unions 
as their bargaining agents, and it does not appear that they 
wish to be organized or to work under a union shop agree-
ment. The majority opinion holds that picketing or other con-
certed activities by the unions to secure union shop agree-
ments is therefore unlawful under state law. In the companion 
case of Chavez v. Sargent, ante, p. 162 [339 P.2d 801], the 
majority opinion holds that a union or closed shop agreement 
is lawful if a majority of the employees wish it and that in 
such a case picketing or other peaceful concerted activity to 
secure a union or closed shop is likewise lawful. 
This is new law ill this state. The majority opiJliolls purport 
to find it in sections 920-923,1115-1120, 1122, and 1126 of the 
May 1959] RETAIL CLBUKS' VNIUN t'. SUPERIOR COURT 229 
152 C.2d :!~2: 339 P.2d 8.191 
----------------------
Labor Code. Since sections 920-923 had been interpreted to 
permit condnct now found to be proscribed, the majority 
.opinions invoke the later-enacted Jurisdictional Strike Act 
(Lab. Code, §§ 1115-1120) and Labor Code, section 1122, to 
support their conclusion that organizational activity carried 
on without the support of or against the wishes of a majority 
of the employees involved is unlawful. The Jurisdictional 
Strike Act, however, deals only with disputes between two or 
more labor organizations, and accordingly, to make its provi-
sions relevant to a dispute between organized and unorganized 
labor, the majority opinions are driven to create a fictitious 
labor organization consisting of the unorganized employees 
and then pitting that unorganized "organization" against the 
unions. 
The Jurisdictional Strike Act says nothing whatever about 
the llew test of legality now adopted. To avoid the prohibition 
of organizational activities by a majority of the employees 
against a dissident unorganized minority under the new con-
struction of that act the majority opinions judicially amend 
it to permit jurisdictional strikes carried on by unions repre-
senting a majority of the employees involved. Such amend-
ment is a flagrant usurpation of legislative power. 
Furthermore, neither section 1122 nor 1126 supports the 
new rules created by the majority opinions. Section 1122, like 
section 923, proscribes employer interference with labor organ-
izations. Far from indicating a legislative repudiation of the 
settled judicial interpretation of section 923 when section 1122 
was enacted, it constitutes a legislative adoption of that inter-
pretation. Section 1126 merely provides for the enforcement 
of collective bargaining agreements. It is silent as to the 
validity of closed or union shop provisions in such agreements 
or the legality of concerted activity undertaken to secure 
them. 
Before the decision of this court in Garmon v. San Diego 
Bldg. Trades Oouncil, 49 Cal.2d 595 [320 P.2d 47~J, it was set-
tled that a closed or union shop is a proper objective of COll-
certed labor activity, since it is reasonably related to union 
welfare and the betterment of working conditions whether or 
not any or a majority of the employees belong to the union 
or wish to bargain collectively. (.T. F. Parkinson Co. v. Build-
ing Trades Oouncil, 154 Cal. 581 [98 P. 1027, ]6 Ann.Cas. 
1165,21 L.R.A. N.S. 550] : McKay v. Relail Auto. S. L. U'llion 
No. 1()67, 16 Ca1.2d 311, 315-325 [l06 P.2tl 3731 ; C. S. Smith 
Met. Market Co. v. Lyons, 16 Ca1.2d 389, 401 [106 P.2d 414] ; 
~30 RETAIL CLERK:;;' UNION V. SUPERIOR COURT [52 C.2d 
------_ .. _----
Jlagill Bros. v. Building Service etc. Union, 20 Ca1.2d 506, 
508 [127 P.2d 542] ; James v. Marillship Corp., 25 Ca1.2d 721, 
730 [155 r.2d 329, 160 A.L.R. 900]; Park &- T. I. Corp. v. 
Internati01/al etc. of Teamsters, 27 Ca1.2d 599, 604 [165 P.2d 
891, 162 A.L.R. 1426] ; Oharles H. Benton, Inc. v. Painters 
Local Union, 45 Ca1.2d 677, 681 [291 P.2d 13].) 'l'he r~aSOllS 
for permitting picketing to compel a closed or union shop, 
even when none of the employees belong to the picketing union, 
were articulated in O. S. SmUh Met. Mat'ket Co. v. Lyons, 16 
Ca1.2d 389, 401 [106 P.2d 414] : "The members of a labor 
organization may have a substantial interest in tIle employ-
ment relations of an employer although none of them is or 
ever has been employed by him. The reason for this is that 
the employment relations of every employer affect the working 
couditions and bargaining power of employees throughout the 
industry in which he competes. Hence, where union and non-
union employees are engaged in a 3itni1ar oeeupation and theil' 
respective employers are ell~aged in trade competition one 
with another, thc efforts of the union to extend its membership 
to the employments in which it has no foothold is not an un-
reasonable aim." (See also Sl!hauer, J. dissenting ill Bautista 1 
v. Jones, 25 Cal.2d 746, 767, 783 [155 P.2d 343].) 
In the Garmon case, by reinterpreting section 923 of the 
Labor Code and invoking the Jurisdictional Strike Act, the 
court held that a union shop contract is an unlawful objective 
under state law when nOlle of the employees wish to join or be 
represented by the union. The court concluded that by signiug' 
a union shop agreement the employer would iuterfel'e with hi~ 
employees' rights" in the designation of . . . representatives 
or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protee-
tion" (Lab. Code, § 923) in violation of section 923. As I 
pointed out in my dissent ill the Garmon case, the court in 
effect overruled a settled rule of decision to the contrary and 
in particular Shafer v. Registered Pharmacists Union, 16 Cal. , 
2d 379, 383-388 [106 P.2d 403], which expressry held that 
sections 920-923 of the IJahor Code do not restrid the right of ' 
labor to engage ill eOIlf'ertl'c1 Ilrtivity to attain a ('losen or 
union shop. 
The Garmon (·It''C dpa1t with 11 business that afft'f'tl'd inter-
::;tatc commer,"e and was rcvCl'sell Oil tIle qne:;tiol1 of federal 
precmption in San Diego Rlli111'llgl'rades OOlweil v. am'mOIl, 
~ij9 U.S. 2:36 [79 S.Ct. 77:1. 3 rd~11.2tl 77ri}. ;\for·C'()wl'. it wa~ 
decided on all erroneous assnmption that the conclud found 
) 
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tortious under state law was also illegal under federal law. As 
. t.he United States Supreme Court pointed out, however, it was 
. by no means clear that the conduct involved violated federal 
law. ·In fact, it may have been protected by that law. (See 
Labor Management Relations Act, §§ 7,8 (b), 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 
158 (b).) If, despite these weaknesses in this court's Garmon 
decision, the majority opinions in the present cases adhered to 
it on the question of the illegality of union or closed shop con-
tracts and concerted activity to achieve them under state law, 
it would be necessary to determine if that case controls the 
present ones. In my opinion, however, there is no basis \vhat-
soever in the statutory law of this state for distinguishing be-
tween a closed or union shop agreement sought by a union rep-
resenting a majority of the employees and such an agreement 
sought by a union representing none or only a minority of the 
employees. By agreeing to hire only union members or to 
require new employees to join the union, the employer in either 
case assists the union in controlling the labor market and 
thereby enables it to recruit and retain members. It makes 
no difference to the nonunion employee who wishes to remain 
unorganized whether he is compelled to accede to the wishes of 
a majority of his fellow employees in the same shop or to the 
pressure of a union seeking to organize a shop in which it has 
not yet gained a foothold. If the employer accedes to the 
demand for a closed or union shop in either case, he interferes 
with the right of unorganized employees to remain unorgan-
ized. Such interference was not proscribed before the Garmon 
case, for it was merely incidental to the union's pursuit of a 
proper objective. Section 923 does not provide that a closed or 
union shop is a lawful objective when the union has a majority 
but an unlawful objective when it does not. It does not make 
the legality of concerted union activity turn on the extent of 
the success the union has already achieved in the particular 
shop it seeks to organize. Accordingly, if, as the Garmon cnSl' 
held, it is unlawful employer interference to make a union 
or closed shop agreement with a union that does not represeut 
a majority of the employees, it is also such interference to make 
such an agreement with a union that does. By distinguishing 
between these two situations the majority opinions in the 
present ea"es at least in part repndiate the Garmon decision, 
antI it is signifieant that they now point out that "our conclu-
sions in the present case ... al'e independent of, and do not 
rest on, onr second Garmon decision, supra, 49 Ca1.2d 595." 
232 RETAIL CLERKS' UNION tI. SUPERIOR COURT [52 C.2d 
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For these reasons the Garmon case does not control the present 
eases. 
. The majority opinions hold that a closed or union shop agree-
ment and concerted activity to achieve it are lawful, but only 
if a majority of the employees to be covered by the agreement 
wish it. Such a limitation is admittedly contrary to the law 
as it was understood before the enactment of the Jurisdictional 
Strike Act in 1947. Moreover, it finds no support whatever 
in that act as a reading of its provisions makes abundantly 
clear. In Seven Up etc. Co. v. Grocery etc. Union, 40 Ca1.2d 
368, 381 [254 P.2d 544, 33 A.L.R.2d 327], we sustained the 
constitutionality of the act and summarized its effect as fol-
lows: "Wisely or unwisely the Legislature has declared the 
policy of this state that an employer's business shall not be 
interfered with or the public welfare disrupted by reason of an 
argument between two or more unions as to which shall be 
chosen to represent his employees. . . . The act eliminates the 
situation where the labor organization is employer controlled, 
hence an independent union is not prevented from endeavoring 
to organize an employer's employecs when they belong to an 
employer controlled union or flO union." (Italics added.) We 
are now told, however, that organizational pressure is "essen-
tially a jurisdictional dispute pressure," and that" any group 
of employes, organized or unorganized in the formal, conven-
tional sense, who were free of the proscribed employer influ-
ence and who determined and informed their employer through 
their authorized spokesman that they were unwilling to accede 
to the demands of an organizer or unwanted union, and that 
they were satisfied with the terms and conditions of their em-
ployment and wished to continue in the established employe-
employer relationship, would thereby act as and constitute a 
'labor organization' within the meaning of sections 1117 and 
1118. " (Oha.vcz v. Sargent, ante, pp. 162, 20~ [339 P .2d i 
801].) , 
To constitute a labor organization, sections 1117 and 1118 
of the Labor Code require more than an agreement not to be 
organized. Such an organization must exist for the purpose 
"of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor dis-
putes, wages, hours of employment or conditions of work." 
(Lab. Code, § 1117.) A group whose sole purpose is to ex-
press the wish of its members not to deal as a group with the 
employer" concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, hours 
of employment or conditions of work" is obviously not an 
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organization that exists for the purposf'S stated in section 
1117. It is a contradiction in terms to hold that a group 
,~bose purpose is not to bargain is nevertheless 8. bargaining 
. ~gent. But even if such a group could be a labor organization 
under section 1117, its objection to organization of the shop 
could not give rise to a jurisdictional strike within the mean-
ing of section 1118. Such a strike can only arise out of a 
"controversy between two or more labor organizations as to 
which of them has or should have the exclusive right to bar-
gain collectively with an employer ... [or] the exclusive 
right to have its members perform work for an employer." 
(Lab. Code, § 1118.) The wish of all or some of the employees 
to work in an open shop without collective bargaining is the 
very antithesis of a demand for the "exclusive right to bar-
gain collectively" or for the "exclusiye right to have [their] 
members perform work for [the] employer." 
Even if a dispute with the fictitious organization created 
by the majority opinion in the Chavez case could give rise 
to a jurisdictional strike, there is no such dispute here. The 
trial court did not find that the employees had an "authorized 
spokesman" who' informed the employer "that they were 
unwilling to accede to the demands of an organizer or un-
wanted union, and that they were satisfied with the terms and 
conditions of their employment and wished to continue in 
the established employe-employer relationship." (Ohavez v. 
Sal·gent, ante, pp. 162, 203 [339 P.2d 801].) It found only 
that "Most of the employees of plaintiffs are not members 
of the defendant labor organization and the employees of 
plaintiffs have not at any time demanded from plaintiffs a 
union shop or union recognition, nor have such employees 
participated at any time in the negotiations for collective 
bargaining agreements, nor have the employees of plaintiffs 
designated the defendants or any of them as their representa-
tives for collective bargaining." At most this finding simply 
shows that the employees were indifferent to tRe unions' ef-
forts. It does not even suggest a common wish to retain the 
status quo. The burden of establishing the existence of a labor 
organization within the meaning of the Jurisdictional Strike 
Act is on the plaintiff seeking relief pursuant to its terms. 
(Lab. Code, § 1117.) It is obvious that plaintiffs did not 
meet this burden. They did not even attempt to do so, for 
the novel theory that the Jurisdictional Strike Act might be 
appli!·able to a dispute between a union and unorganized em-
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ployeel> was yet to be suggested for the first time in the Gar-
mon case. 
The logic of the majority opinions' invocation of the Juris-
dictional Strike .<\.ct would carry thcm far beyond where they 
profess willingness to go. The existence of an organization 
docs not depend on the number of its members so long as there 
are more than one. Thus, if a majority of the employees ill 
a shop are a labor organization because they wish to remahl 
unorganized, so must be a minority that wish to remain un-
organized. Any dispute between a union and the unorganized 
employees would result in a jurisdictional strike if the union 
engaged in concerted activity to advance its position. (Lab. 
Code, § 1118.) Dnder thc reasoning of the majority opinions 
as few as two employees who did not wish to Le organized 
would constitute a labor organization. If the terms or the act 
are to be thus distorted to make the unorganized organized, 
no concerted activity for collective bargaiuing is lawful un-
less the employees involved achieve substantial uuallimity. 
As the majority opinions tacitly concede, no such absurd 
result was contemplated by the Legislature, and to avoid it, 
the majority opinions are driven to limit the application or 
the act to cases where the organizational activity is carried 
on by a union that does not represent a majority of the em-
ployees involved. The Jurisdictional Strike Act, however, 
does not provide for majority rule; majority rule is the 
creation of the majority opinions. By its terms the act pro-
tects the employer from jurisdictional strife between labor 
organizations without regard to where the preference of a ma-
jority of his employees may lie. He is entitled to relief if 
he proves that a jurisdictional strike exists. He need not 
prove that the union engaged in the proscribed activity docs 
not represent a majority. As now amended the act affords 
him much less protection, and it may come as a shock to em-
ployers who assumed that they were protected from true 
jurisdictional concerted activities conducted by powerful COll-
tending unions to learn that relief may be secured only: against 
the union found to represent a minority or none or'the em-
ployees. 
The majority opinions' reliance on srdion 1122 of the 
J1abor Code is eqnally illogieal. 'l'hat sectiotl Jll'ovides that 
"AllY person who organizes nn employee gronp which is 
financed in whole or in part, interfered with or dominated or 
('olltrolled by the employer or any employer assoeiation, as 
well as Sl1rh employer or employt'r association, 811a11 he 1 iahle 
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to suit by any person who is injured thereby. Said injured 
party shall recover the damages sustained by him and the costs 
of suit. " Weare told that" The proscription in this language 
extends not alone to the act of organizing an employee group 
financed by an employer but also to organizing any group of 
employes wherein the act of organizing such group, i.e., ob-
taining the consent of the employes to join ill the organization, 
is either 'interfered with or dominated or controlled by the 
employer.' ... For an employer to notify his employt's that 
he has agreed with a union which is, and which he knows to 
be, unauthorized and unwanted by his employes, that they 
must join such union and be represented by it or be dismissed 
from employment would appear to constitute an unlawful 
interference by the employer and subject him to the liability 
imposed by seetion 1122." (Chavez v. Sargent, ante, pp. 
162, 205 [339 P.2d 801].) 
Section 1122 was added to the Labor Code ill 1955 by the 
. same act that amended section 1117 to put the burden on the 
plaintiff of establishing the existenee of a labor organization. 
(Stats. 1955, ch. 1417, §§ 1-2.) Its obvious purpose is to pre-
vent abuse of the Jurisdictional Strike Act by discouraging 
employers from organizing company union. 'I to create the ap-
pearance of jurisdictional strikes when none in fact exist. It 
prohibits, not the execution of union or Closcd shop agree-
ments with independent union.'1, but the organizing of an 
employer-interfered-with group. Moreover, if it did constitute 
employer interference within the meaning of section 1122 to 
execute a closed or union shop agreement with a union that 
does not represent a majority of the employees, it ,vould like-
wise constitute such interference to execute such an agreement 
with a union representing a majority of them. Here, as in the 
case of the Jurisdictional Strike Act, however, the majority 
opinions shrink from the logic of their position and read into 
section 1122 language that is not there to permit what in their 
view would be employer interferenre but for the ;ish of a 
majority of the employees to have a closed or uniou shop agree-
ment. Before the decision in the Garmon case it was settled 
that the proscription of employer interference in section 923 
of the Labor Code did not outla,v dosed or nnion SllOP agree-
ments even though the employees did not wish them. Not only 
must the similar inhibitions of se(~tion ] 122 be interpreted in 
accord with the established interpretation or sl'dion 923 at the 
time section 1122 was enacted, but the f/lilure of the IJegisla-
) 
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ture to amend section 923 when it enacted both the Jurisdic-
tional Strike Act and section 1122 affords cogent evidence that 
. it approved the existing interpretation of section 923. (See 
. ['coplc v. Nash, ante, pp. 36, 46-47 [338 P.2d 416]; Colc 
v. Ru.sh, 45 Ca1.2d 345, 355 [289 P.2d 450, 54 A.L.R.2d 1137] ; 
Buckley v. Chadwick, 45 Ca1.2d 183, 200 [288 P.2d 12, 289 
P.2d 242].) 
Thus, neither the Jurisdictional Strike Act nor section 1122 
of the Labor Code supports a reinterpretation of section 923 
to restrict the right of workmen to engage in concerted organ-
izational activity. Before the Garmon decision such activities 
were fully protected as part of the individual ,vorkman's "full 
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of 
representatives of his own choosing." (Lab. Code, § 923.) Of 
course the right of a union effectively to compete for employ-
ment on satisfactory terms for its members by seeking a closed 
or union shop interferes with the right of nonunion workmen 
to go it alone. Its recognition is not at war, however, as the 
majority opinions suggest, with either union democracy or 
majority rule unless the relevant majority is determined with 
myopic vision. A union that seeks control of available employ-
ment cannot arbitrarily close its ranks to qualified workmen 
or deny them full participation in its councils (James v. 
Marinship Corp., 25 Ca1.2d 721, 730-734 [155 P.2d 329, 160 
A.L.R. 900]; Thorman v. International Alliance etc. Em-
ployees,49 Ca1.2d 629,632 [320 P.2d 494]), and accordingly, 
democratic representation must be afforded to those the union 
claims the right to represent. Moreover, by approving the 
legality of a closed or union shop when a majority of the 
workmen directly involved wish it, the majority opinions 
recognize that the right to remain unorganized is subject to 
legitimate group interests and pressures. By looking only to 
the workmen immediately involved, however, the majority 
opinions blind themselves to the essential interrelation of 
working conditions in competitive businesses and choose as thc 
relevant group whose majority may govern, not all of the work-
men with interests in common, but only a small fraction of 
them. It is true that we have no mechanism for determining 
whether a majority of all workmen with common interests do 
or do not wish collective bargaining through unions in which 
they may freely participate,' but if each workman the union 
seeks to represent is protected in his right to parti<,ipate in 
union affairs, the danger of a minority thrusting itself 011 an 
unwilling majority in the labor market would be remote. 
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Moreover, the "outcome of concerted acth·it.ies for a rIosed 
. shop depends largely on public sentiment. No eompetitive 
. business can endure indefinitely without good will; no group 
.of workers cau long define the terms of its employment without i 
public support." (Pa7'k & T. I. Corp. v. I nternatiollaZ etc. of 
Teamste1'S, 27 Ca1.2d 599, 608 [165 P.2d 891, 162 A.L.R. 
1426].) 
One searches the California statutes relied upou by the 
majority opinions in vain for a hint of the new law of labor-
management relations set forth today. Either the proscriptions , 
of employer interference in sections 923 and 1122 preclude . 
(·losed or union shop contracts or they do not. Neither section 
affords any support for the conclusion that they are sometimes 
lawful and sometimes not, depending on the wishes of a ma-
jority of the employees directly involved. The requirement of 
majority rule haS been lifted from section 8 (a) (3) (i) of the 
federal Labor Management Relations Act. (29 U.S. C., §§ 158, 
159.) Such borrowing is obviously a legislative function. 
Moreover, the administrative machinery that is not only basic 
to the operation of the federal act but necessary to make SE-C-
tion 8 (a) (3) (i) effective and workable is not so easily come 
by. The majority opinion in the Chavez case suggests that em-
ployers and Unions may cooperate in conducting free elections, 
and so I suppose they may. But who is to determine the ap-
propriate bargaining unit or conduct an election when the 
parties disagree or refuse to cooperateT (See §§ 8(a) (3) (i); 
9 (b); 29 U.S.C. §§ 158, 159.) These difficulties, of course, 
only emphasize the impropriety of usurping the legislative 
function. If we are to have a little Labor Management Rela-
tions Act, it is for the Legislatnre, not this court to enact it. 
I am cOllvinced that union or closed shop agreements and 
concerted activities to achieve them are lawful under the law 
of this state whether or not a majority of the employees wish 
them. The majority opinions do not state that any of the cases 
so holding were wrongly decided, but apparelltly convinced I 
that the time is now ripe for striking a new balance between ' 
the rights of organized and unorganized labor and employers, 
they Reize upon the Jurisdictional Strike Act to achieve an 
objective foreign to its purpose, By enacting the Jurisdietional 
Strike Act the Legislature did not change or modify the policy 
set forth in section 923 insofar as purely organizational union 
activity is concerned, Only by amending that act by judicial 
fiat to provide for "majority rule" and applying it when it is 
obviously inapposite do the majority opinions achieve their 
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aims. The conclusion is inescapable t.hat in both method and 
result they have usurped legislative power. 
Gibson, C. J., concurred. 
Petitioners' application for a rehearing was denied June, 
18, 1959. Peters, J., did not participate therein. Gibson, 
C. J., and Traynor, J., were of the opinion that the petition 
should be granted. 
